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effort to put them under public observation. In every community there
should be some civic organization to which citizens could report abuses
with the knowledge that such complaints will be thoroughly investigated. Every effort should be made to bring about the cessation of
the practice of the third degree, which is a violation of some of the
most fundamental principles of the law.
MARTHA MANINMG.
TORTs-NEGLIGENCE--INFERENCE

OF NEGLIGENOE FROM PRovEN FACTS.

-The defendant railroad company was the owner of a bridge in Frankfort, Kentucky. It permitted the city and county to build a foot-path
along the side for public use, but reserved the right to stop the public
use at any time by paying for all the expense of constructing said
path. The public used this for many years. Sometime before the accident the defendant closed the bridge for repairs. When the bridge
was again opened to the public one of the guard rails between the
path and the railroad track was left exposed. The deceased was killed
while crossing this bridge at night, and the first evidence of blood was
found neat the exposed rail. There were no witnesses except the deceased's small son who was not permitted to testify. While there are
other facts in the case, these are all that are necessary for the point
we will discuss, namely, "Inference of negligence from proven facts."
In handing down the decision in this case the court said that while
negligence cannot be presumed, it can be inferred from proven facts;
and in this case the facts are sufficient to justify such an inference.
L. & .N Ry. Co. v. Snow's Adrnrs., 235 Ky 211, 30 S. W (2d) 885.
It appears that the Kentucky court has held consistently to the
rule laid down in the principal case. Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan,
180 Ky. 609, 203 S. TV 555, John R. Coffin Co. v. Richards, 191 Ky 720,
231 S. W 229. It is likewise the rule in practically every other jurisdiction. Penn. Sash Door Co., 273 F 993; Burke v. City of Baltinore, 127 Md. 554, 6 A. 693; O'Donnell v. Lange, 163 Mich. 654, 127 N.
W 691.
However, there seems to be some dispute as to how strong the
inference must be. The better view seems to be that the facts need
not tend to exclude the inference of the accident happening in any
other way, but need only raise the inference of its being caused by the
wrongful act, and this must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Austin v. Penn. R. Co., 82 N. J. Law 416, 81 A. 739; Hfurcher v.
N. Y. & Queens Elee., Etc., Co., 143 N. Y. S. 639, 153 App. Div. 422. Yet
at least one jurisdiction holds that the evidence must not only affirmatively show negligence but must also tend to exclude any other cause.
Wallace v. Chscago M. & P S. By. Co., 48 Mont. 427, 138 P 499. We
have been unable to find where the Kentucky court has considered this
ppint, but it can be fairly deduced from the cases that it would not
follow the Montana court.
Inference of negligence from proven facts is not to be confused
with res spsa loquitur Res spsa loqaitur is a rule of evidence by which
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negligence is presumed, while an inference of negligence is an inference that is drawn by the jury from the facts. Res ipsa loquitur is a
question of law. The cases are collected in 20 R. C. L. 157.
In conclusion we would say that Kentucky follows the general
rule, that negligence may be inferred from proven facts, and the evidence need not be such as would tend to exclude any other cause, but
only such as would permit a reasonable inference to be drawn.
EDWARD DuvAL.
CnIxEs-PREsonipTIo DoEs NOT RUN AGAINST THE PunLIc.-A prescriptive right to maintain a public nuisance does not exist. Ashbrook
v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 139 (1866), Eraver v. Smith, 164
Ky. 674, 177 S. W 286 (1915), Joyce's Law on Nuisances, See. 50. This
general, and long existing rule of law, was laid down as early as
1699. Anonymous, 12 Mod. 342. In this case, the defendant was indicted for keeping gunpowder in a house in town. Holt, C. J., in deciding that case, did so on four points: (1) Evidence--"to support this
indictment there must be apparent danger, or mischief already done;"
(2) Time--"though it had been done for fifty or sixty years, yet if it
be a nuisance, time will not make it lawful;" (3) Place---"if at the
time of setting up this house in which the gunpowder was kept there
had been no houses near enough to be prejudiced by it, but some were
built since, it would be at the peril of the builder;" (4) Benefit"though gunpowder be a necessary thing, and for defense of the kingdom, yet if it be kept in such a place as it is dangerous to the inhabitants, it will be a nuisance."
Although place is indeed a vital element in deciding whether a
thing may, or does, constitute a nuisance, the untenable position that
one might build a house in the wilderness and continue to keep a
dangerous substance in it to the peril of the public, who later build
around the house, was soon destroyed. Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray
(Mass.) 473 (1856), Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky (1 Bush) 139
(1866), Sexton v. Youngkau, 202 Ky. 256, 259 S. W 335 (1924). The
basis for these decisions is, of course, public policy. As the court said in,
the second of the foregoing cases, "A contumacious holder of real estate
cannot retard the public of a city, by refusing to let a street car run
through his land; nor can he, by a noxious trade or pursuit, deprive
the public of its use after its appropriation."
How, then, do so many courts find a way of sanctioning the continuance of public nuisances? What is there that so often makes a
mockery of this strong, unhesitant, unequivocal language?
It is in the first of Mr. Chief Justice Holt's four points that the
courts find the necessary loophole. It appears a very narrow loophole.
Used rightly, it would no doubt prove an elastic, useful tool, whereby
the ends of justice might be more nearly served. But, also, it is an
opening through which a number of judges have unconcernedly driven
a team of horses. Thus, in Richmond v. House, 177 Ky. 814, 198 S. W
218, (1917), a stockyard was held not to be a nuisance per se although

